Introduction A security token is a set of information that facilitates the sharing of identity and security information in heterogeneous environments or across security domains.
Security tokens are typically signed to achieve integrity and sometimes also encrypted to achieve confidentiality.
Security tokens are also sometimes described as Assertions, such as in [RFC]. A Security Token Service STS is a service capable of validating security tokens provided to it and issuing new security tokens in response, which enables clients to obtain appropriate access credentials for resources in heterogeneous environments or across security domains.
The OAuth 2.
The conventional OAuth 2. However, its input and output are somewhat too constrained as is to fully accommodate a security token exchange framework.
This specification defines a protocol extending OAuth 2. Similar to OAuth 2. A new grant type for a token exchange request and the associated specific parameters for such a request to the token endpoint are defined by this specification.
A token exchange response is a normal OAuth 2. The entity that makes the request to exchange tokens is considered the client in the context invest binary options signals the token exchange interaction.
However, that does not restrict usage of this profile to traditional OAuth clients. An OAuth resource token exchange, for example, might assume the role of the client during token exchange in order to trade an access token that it received in a protected resource request for a new token that is appropriate to include in a call to a backend service.
The new token might be an access token that is more narrowly scoped token exchange the downstream service or it could be an entirely different kind of token.
Make the token exchange request to CERN SSO
The scope of this specification is limited to the definition of a basic request-and-response protocol for an STS-style token exchange utilizing OAuth 2.
Although a few new JWT claims are defined that enable delegation semantics to be expressed, the specific syntax, semantics and security characteristics of the tokens themselves both those presented to the authorization server and those obtained by the client token exchange explicitly out of scope and no requirements are placed on the trust token exchange in which an implementation might be deployed.
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- RFC - OAuth Token Exchange
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- The subject access token that the client wants to exchange scope The set of scopes requested for the new access token audience Optional.
The security tokens obtained may be used in a number of contexts, the specifics of which are also beyond the scope of this specification. Delegation vs. Impersonation Semantics One common use case for an STS as alluded to in the previous section is to allow a resource server A to make calls to a backend service C on behalf of the requesting user B.
Impersonation vs delegation
Depending on the local site policy and authorization infrastructure, it may be desirable for A to use its own credentials to access C along with an annotation of some form that A is acting on behalf of B "delegation"or for A to be granted a limited access credential to C but that continues to identify B as the authorized entity "impersonation". Delegation and impersonation can be useful concepts in other scenarios involving multiple participants as well.
- Token Exchange - Authorization Service
- A client may want to invoke on a less trusted application so it may want to downgrade the current token it has.
When principal A impersonates principal B, A is given all the rights that B has within some defined rights context and is indistinguishable from B in that context. Thus, when principal A impersonates principal B, then insofar as any entity receiving such a token is concerned, they are actually dealing with B. It is true that some members of the identity system might have awareness that impersonation is going on, but it is not a requirement.
For all intents and purposes, when A is impersonating B, A is B within the context of the rights authorized by the token. A's ability to impersonate B could be limited in scope or time, or even with a one-time-use restriction, whether via the contents of the token or an out-of-band mechanism. Delegation semantics are different than impersonation semantics, though the two are closely related.
With delegation semantics, principal A still token exchange its own identity separate from B and it is explicitly token exchange that while B may have delegated some of its rights to A, any actions taken are being taken by A representing B. In a sense, A is an agent for B.
OAuth Token exchange API · GitBook
Delegation and impersonation are not inclusive of all situations. When a principal is acting directly on its own behalf, for example, neither delegation nor impersonation are in play.
They are, however, the more common semantics operating for token exchange and, as such, are given more direct treatment in this specification. Delegation semantics are typically expressed in a token by including information about both the primary subject of the token as well as the actor to whom that subject has delegated some of its rights.
Such a token is sometimes referred to as a composite token because it is composed of information about multiple subjects. A composite token issued by the authorization server will contain information about both parties. When and if a composite token is issued is at the discretion of the authorization server and applicable policy and configuration. The specifics of representing a composite token and even whether or not such a token will be issued depend on the token exchange of the implementation and the kind of token.
The representations of composite tokens that are not JWTs are beyond the scope of this specification.
Client configuration requirements
Terminology This specification uses the terms "access token type", "authorization server", "client", "client identifier", "resource server", "token endpoint", "token request", and "token response" defined by OAuth 2.
Request A client token exchange a security token by making a token request to the authorization server's token endpoint using the extension grant type mechanism defined in Section 4. Client authentication to the authorization server is done using the normal mechanisms provided by OAuth 2. Section 2.
Request token exchange permissions
The supported methods of client authentication and whether or not to allow unauthenticated or unidentified clients are deployment decisions that are at the discretion of the authorization server.
Note that omitting client authentication allows for a compromised token to be leveraged via an Token exchange into other tokens by anyone possessing the compromised token.
Jones Request for Comments: A. Campbell, Ed. Ping Identity J. Bradley Yubico C. Mortimore Visa January OAuth 2.
Thus client authentication allows for additional authorization checks by the STS as to which entities are permitted to impersonate or receive delegations from other entities.